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Prologue
In 1979, I had a chance to meet Paul Meehl, the co-author of the famous Minnesota 
Multi phasic Perso nality Inven tory (MMPI). I admired him for his writings on methodological 
issues in psychology, like “When to use your head instead of a formula” (Meehl 1957). 
At that time, I was not sure whether my new idea about psychological measurement 
(University of Konstanz; Germany; georg.lind@uni-konstanz.de)
Georg Lind
Making Human Traits Visible, Objectively and Validly,
through Experimentally Designed Questionnaires
ORCID: 0000-0002-2235-5465
Abstract: Researchers who need valid and objective data for evaluating their theories 
or the efficacy of educational methods and programs have to choose between two 
equally undesirable alternatives: either they can use “objective” methods which have a 
questionable validity, or they can turn to “subjective” assessment methods with better 
validity. In other words, while subjective approaches to the study of human traits may be, 
or really are, valid, they lack objectivity, that is, they may be biased toward the researcher’s 
theory. On the other hand, objective approaches to the study of psychological traits often 
lack psychological underpinning but are solely designed to fit a certain statistical model. 
Thus, we cannot know what these instruments really measure.
 Here I present a new approach to the study of human traits, which claims to be 
objective as well as psychologically valid, namely the concept Experimental Questionnaire 
(EQ). An EQ lets us make traits visible without relying on dubious statistical assumptions. 
Thus, it makes it possible for the researcher to test the psychological theory underlying its 
designs. The EQ methodology is not only an idea, but it has been applied for constructing the 
Moral Competence Test (MCT) and for testing the assumptions about the nature of moral 
competence which were used to design it. So far, all the studies have clearly confirmed 
their validity. This makes the MCT suitable for testing hypotheses regarding the relevance 
and teachability of moral competence, and, therefore, also for evaluating the efficacy and 
efficiency of educational methods of fostering this competence. 
 Experimentally designed questionnaires can also be used in other fields of 
educational and psychological research in which testable theories about the nature of its 
objects have been developed.
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would hold water. After listen ing patiently to my critique of mainstream psychological 
testing and my idea that should replace it, he cautioned me. He said that psy cho logists 
and educators would hardly welcome this new idea because if they did, they would have 
to give up the tests with which they make their living. Today, 40 years later, I know he was 
right. Fortu nate ly he had added “Go on!” That encouraged me to write this paper.
 The Persisting Dilemma of Psychological and Educational 
Measurement
Millions of dollars are spent every year on tests of character, academic abilities, 
vocational skills, men tal disorders and so on, in the hope that their findings help to 
improve therapy, educa tion and the politics of mental health and education (Gregory 
2018, 22). But anyone who seeks the service of psychology (which translates to “science 
of the mind”) faces a persistent dilemma. One has to choose between two opposite 
approaches to the observation and measurement of psychological traits, both of which 
have their drawbacks:
“Subjective” (also called “qualita tive”) psycho logists argue that the focus on studying 
the internal struc ture of the human mind will indeed pro vide badly needed insights on 
the human con di tion. The human mind, they insist, can be studied only by using subjective 
methods like clinical interview. 
In contrast, “objec tive” (“quantitative”) psycholo gists argue that if psycho logy 
wants to be re cognized as a science, it must use only objective methods of measure ment. 
Notably, both agree that the internal fac tors of the human mind and its struc ture are out of 
reach for objec tive measure ment. Can psy chology really become a science if it spares the 
direct, objective measurement of its very objects?
For many years eminent scholars have argued that this deficit has prevented 
psycho logi cal and educational research from deve loping into a real science (Travers 1951; 
Loevinger 1957; Miller 1962) and from play ing a more con struc tive role in evaluating and 
improving education (Schoenfeld 1999; Ravitch 2013).
For centuries, psychology and education were part of philosophy and, therefore, the 
domain of subjective science. Philosophers who focused on the nature of the human mind 
mostly used subjective methods for studying it. Their methods tended to be ideographic 
(acknow ledging the individuality of the person) and holistic (taking the whole structure 
of the indivi dual per sonality into account).
This philosophical approach to the study of the human mind was challenged in the 
19th century by objective psycho logists who were at home in physics, biology and medicine. 
They argued that psychological research must be nomothetic (searching for general 
laws) and objec tive, studying people’s behaviors instead of the structure of their mind: 
“The behaviorist recognizes no such things as mental traits, dispositions or tendencies,” 
postulated Watson (1970/1924, 98), the founder of psychological beha viorism, which is 
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still very influential. He and his followers believe that psychological mea sure ment should 
focus on behavior instead of on psychological traits: “A test is a standar dized procedure 
for sampling behavior and describing it with categories or scores” (Gregory 2018, 23). 
Their object is not genuinely psycho logical but only somehow “related” to psychology: 
“We define psycholo gi cal assessment as the gathering and integration of psycho logy-
related data” (Cohen & Swerd lik 2018, 2).
 
This antagonism of the two approaches has caused a deep “crisis of psychology” 
(Büh ler 1927) which hampers the progress of psychology as a science to this day. As the 
philosopher Wittgenstein (1953) noted: “In psy cho logy there are experimental methods 
and conceptual confusion. The existence of ex peri men tal methods makes us think we have 
the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and methods pass 
one another by.” Eminent psychologists agree. Similarly, Graumann wrote: “Theoretical 
frameworks and metho do logical convic tions are still too diver gent, if not partially 
incommensurable” (Grauman 1960, 146, my transl.). Block (1977) also asserted that 
“perhaps 90% of the studies are metho do logically inadequate, without conceptual impli-
cation, and even foolish” (Block 1977, 39). The edu cational researcher Travers observed 
“that the rather meager advances made in many areas of psychological measurement during 
the last 20 years are main ly a con sequence of the fact that these areas are staffed mainly 
by technicians interest ed in pro ducing useful instru ments and not by scientists interested 
in expanding know ledge” (Travers 1951, 137). The statistician and psychologist Kempf 
wrote: “What usually is called psychological test theory is actually a statistical theory of 
item selection in order to produce a test with some desirable features” (Kempf 1981, 3, 
my transl.). Ten years later, Alan Schoenfeld (1999), former pre sident of the American 
Educational Research Association (AERA) and an accom plished educational re sear cher 
and mathe ma tician, complained that still “virtually none of the current assessments in 
wide use are ground ed in well-developed theories of competence” (Schoenfeld 1999, 12). 
Therefore, he called for a mora torium on standar dized testing until this basic issue has 
been solved. More and more educational researchers, teachers, parents and educational 
policy makers question the meaningfulness and validity of standardized testing (Amrein 
& Berliner 2002; Ravitch 2013; Sjoberg 2017; Koretz 2017).
Yet not much has changed. Textbooks on psychological tests and measurement do 
not respond to any of these complaints (Gregory 2018; Cohen & Swerdlik 2018) In psycho -
logi cal measurement, it seems, we have to choose between Scylla and Charybdis, that is, 
between a psychological object which cannot be measured through objective methods, on 
the one hand, and an objective method which rejects psychological objects, on the other. 
How can we overcome this impasse? Is it really not possible to study the human 
mind objectively without giving up its genuine object?
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    The Critical Role of Theory in Measurement
In everyday life we measure all kind of things by reading a scale like a meter stick 
without much thinking. But we should remember that before we used the meter we had 
other means of measurement like our hands, feet or elbows. Usually, we do not give it any 
thought that measurement is something artificial, that is, something which is based on 
conven tions and theoretical assumptions. But “there is no measure ment without a theory 
and no operation which can be satisfac torily described in non-theore tical terms” (Popper 
1968, 62). The theoretical assumptions concern, for example, the stability of the material 
of which the meter stick is made. A rubber band would not be suitable. If the stick is made 
out of metal, the sur round ing temperature might cause the stick to constrict or expand and 
thus bias our measure ment. Using a thermometer requires that the expansion of the fluid 
inside the instru ments expands strictly proportionally to the sur rounding temperature. 
Research shows that this is true only within a certain range of temperature. Outside this 
range, the thermometer gives incorrect numbers.
The same is true for psychological measurement. When we “read” people’s intelli-
gence, morality, political attitudes etc. from their visib le behavior, this reading is also 
based on theore tical assumptions, namely assumptions about the relationship of observ-
able behavior to the things we are interested in. As I will discuss below, even when the 
relationship between a certain behavior and a certain trait looks simple as in the case of 
classical attitu des scales, attitude tests produce ambiguous data. For example, a score 
in the middle range of a conservatism scale can mean that the participant has a “middle 
attitude toward conservatism.” But it can also mean that he or she has no attitude toward 
conservatism at all, or that he or she has a high differentiated attitude (Scott 1968). The 
relation ship between overt behavior and under lying traits can be even more complex 
when we look at the relationship between answers to a clinical interview and, let’s say, a 
participant’s stage of moral development (Lind 1989). 
Measurement theories are the link between reality and our theories of reality. If 
measurement does not provide us with valid data about reality, our thinking and our 
decisions will be misled by false images of the world. Hence it is essential that measurement 
theories are testable and that we actually do test them. Only if our measurement provides 
valid data, can we trust them and use them for examining the empirical truth of hypotheses 
about the relevance, determinants and teachability of psychological traits. 
 will now discuss the two main approaches to measurement in current psychology: 
the “subjective” and the “objective” approaches. As I mentioned, both have severe 
shortcomings.
 The “Subjective” Approach
Subjective psychologists base their measurement on the assumption that our 
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behavior is deter min ed mainly by unconscious affects and cognitions. In other words, 
they believe that only through the study of the unconscious level of our mind can we really 
understand human be havior and make education, therapy, and politics more effective. 
They also believe that un con scious affects and cognitions cannot be assessed directly 
but only indirectly, namely through inter preting people’s visible performances in certain 
situations or their answers to the psychologist’s questions.  Interpretation means that 
measurement requires researchers to clearly define their object clearly and concisely, 
and to make assumptions about its nature in behavioral terms, so that these assumptions 
can be objectively tested. These assumptions or hypotheses should be based on coherent 
theories which have been tested by different researchers. 
A scientific definition of a psychological object should allow us to examine the 
truth of the assertion that a test is a valid measure of that object. Unfortunately, in 
psychology the object of measurement is rarely defined in a clear and concise way. Rather 
definitions are tautological, fuzzy, or evasive definitions and, therefore, do not allow us 
to judge a test’s validity. For example, “intelligence” is often tautolo gically defined as 
“what is measured by intelli gence tests” (Bailey 1994, 57); or its definition is vague and 
ambiguous, like this: “One of Sternberg’s very succinct definitions of intelligence states: 
Intelligent behavior involves adapting to your environment, changing your environment, 
or selecting a better environment”1. A psycholo gi cal definition is not “succinct” if it states 
only what is “involved.” Moreover, if several “definitions” (plural!) are available, confusion 
is inevitable. A definition is evasive if it encompasses everything a person does: “the 
aggregate or global capacity of the indivi dual to act purposefully, to think rationally, and 
to deal effective ly with his environ ment” (David Wechsler). No test can measure such a 
“global capacity”, but can only assess a small section of it. The claim that such a section is 
representative for the whole is not testable.
However, there are a few exceptions. Take for example Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
research on the nature of moral judgment com petence. He defines it “as the capacity to 
make deci sions and judgments which are moral (i.e., based on internal princip les) and to 
act in accor dance with such judg ments” (Kohlberg 1964, 425; emphasis added). “Morality 
(...) defined as ‘having moral prin ciples’ includes (…) inner conformity to them in difficult 
situations rather than outer con formity in routine situations” (Kohlberg 1958, 3). 
Kohlberg’s definition is short and clear: (1) It defines the affec tive aspect of 
morality in terms of the indivi dual’s inner moral principles or orientations, (2) It defines 
the cognitive aspect of morality as the structure of his or her overt moral judgments, and 
(3) It defines both as aspects of visible action or behavior. His definition of a psychological 
trait is distinct from most studies of morality (and other human traits): “The trouble with 
such [studies] is that they describe the person externally in terms of his impact on and 
relation to his culture and to the observer’s values. They will not tell us how the individual 




But how can we make an “inner” trait visible? When Kohlberg started his research, 
there were only subjective methods available. Kohlberg followed Piaget’s lead and 
developed his clinical interview method, the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI). In this, the 
interviewer con fronts participants with several dilemma stories in which the protagonists 
have to make a pre sumably difficult decision: Whatever they decide, they violate a 
moral principle. The parti ci pants should say whether they agree or disagree with the 
protagonist’s decision and why. The interviewer follows up their answers to get a rich 
picture of their reasons, and also probes into counter-arguments: Which reasons could 
justify the opposite opinion? The answers of the inter viewees are recorded, transcribed, 
and then categorized by a trained scorer into one of the six “cognitive-developmental 
stages” which Kohlberg (1984) had defined. In the early version of the MJI, the scorer was 
to read through the com plete answers of a participant and then decide which “stage” of 
moral reasoning would best fit them. 
Kohlberg based his method on two assumptions or postulates, name ly that people’s 
moral cog niti ons are organized as a structural whole and that they develop in a pre-
determin ed invariant sequence. He considered the scoring to be valid only if it agrees 
with these two postulates. Since the interview data did not agree well enough with these 
two postulates, he and his students revised the scoring system several times in order 
make it better fit with the data (Kohlberg 1984). 
Inevitably, Kohlberg’s measurement model came under attack from objective 
psychologists. These questioned the MJI’s “objectivity” and “reliability” (Kurti nes & Greif 
1974). They argued that morality must be assessed (1) Through judging their behavior 
by external stan dards of morality (instead of talking to them about their behavior and 
other people’s behavior), and (2) By scoring small pieces of behavior instead of looking 
at it holistically.
In response to these attacks, he and his collaborators also changed the method of 
scoring in order to make it more agreeable with the requirements of objective psychology 
(Colby et al. 1987). But they not only changed the method but actually jettisoned 
Kohlberg’s original concept of moral competence: 
• While Kohlberg (1958, 1963) originally defined moral behavior as behavior 
which is based on internal moral principals, the MJI uses external standards for scoring 
the indi viduals’ responses: “I include in my approach a normative component. (...) That is, 
I assumed the need to define philosophically the entity we study, moral judgment, and to 
give a philosophic rationale for why a higher stage is a better stage” (Kohlberg 1984, 400; 
see also Lind & Nowak 2015).
• Originally Kohlberg based the Stage scores on a holistic analysis of people’s 
total response pattern. He considered structure as the hall mark of his cognitive-
structural approach: “The structure to which I refer is (...) a con struct to subsume a 
variety of different manifest responses. The responses of subjects to the dilemmas and 
their subsequent responses to clinical prob ing are taken to reflect, exhibit, or manifest 
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the structure” (Kohlberg 1984, 407). Later he and his colleagues fragmented the inter-
viewees’ response into “items.” They instructed the scorer to score each item individu ally 
instead: “Each item must have face validity in representing the stage as defined by the 
theory” (Kohlberg 1984, 410). However, through this itemizing of the scoring method, 
the cognitive-structural properties of an indi vi dual’s response pattern become invisible. 
To reclaim some of their original structural idea, they instructed the scorer to put an 
answer into a higher stage, if it was “included in a higher stage idea.” They argue that 
“ideas are often expressed within a higher stage context, which when taken literally or out 
of context would be scored at a lower stage” (Colby et al. 1987, 177). This attempt to save 
their original cognitive-structural feature of the method came under attack by objective 
psycho logists again (Rest 1979, 60). 
• Whereas Kohlberg formerly defined moral competence as an ability and tested this 
ability by confronting the respondents with tough probing questions and counterargu-
ments, later he and his students eliminated these tasks in the revised MJI, presumably for 
the same reasons as for itemizing the scoring; namely to increase the statistical “reliabi-
lity” of the MJI: “Test reliability and test construct validity are one and the same thing” 
(Kohl berg 1984, 424).
Similarly, objective tests of moral development like the De­fining­Issues­Test­(DIT) 
by Rest (1979), the Socio-Moral­ Reflection­Measure­ (SRM) by Gibbs et al. (1992), and 
Haidt’s (2007) test of moral values even take this accommodation of the definition of 
moral competence to stan dar dized testing a step further: They score their res pon dents’ 
answers in regard to exter nal standards. Moreover, while some claim that they assess 
the struc tural proper ties of people’s moral judg ment, their scoring methods chop up the 
person’s structure of judg ments into ato miz ed items, thus making struc tural infor mation 
invisible. Some even claim to measure moral com pe tence, but their tests lack any moral 
task.
 You can’t have your cake and eat it. Kohlberg agreed to improve the “reliability” 
of his clinical interview method at the expense of its theoretical validity (Lind 1989). 
This means that he actually gave up his original concept of moral competence in order to 
comply with the doubtful psychological assumptions underlying the so-called objective 
approach. 
 The “Objective” Approach
“Objective” psychologists believe that psychological theories bias measure ment 
and that we better do without them. Measurement, they demand, should be based only 
on visible acts or beha vior, but not on theory (Watson 1923). 
 However, they cannot in fact avoid theoretical assump tions. Instead of psychological 
theory, they base their measurement on statistical theory. This theory determines which 
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items and which scoring methods are regarded as valid. In other words, their statistical 
models define their object of measurement. Statistical models, they seem to believe, are 
more objec tive than psychological models. But they are not, as we will see.
 The famous Studies in the Nature of Character by Hartshorne and May (1928) are a 
good example of objective behaviorists’ approach to psychological measurement. Funded 
by a church organization, they wanted to test experimentally the hypothesis that character 
exists and that it is fostered through religious instruction. They confronted participants 
with situ ati ons in which they were temp ted to cheat and observed how they reacted. They 
recorded the agree ment or dis agree ment of these reactions with their standard of honesty. 
They explicitly discarded any psychological and philosophical interpretations of their 
subjects’ behavior, because “no progress [of psy cho logical science] can be made, however, 
unless the overt act be observed and, if possible, measured without any reference, for the 
moment, to its motives and its rightness or wrong ness” (Hartshorne & May 1928, 11).
 Obviously, the authors believed that we are able to read the character strength 
of a person direct ly from his or her reactions to temptations to deceive, like reading a 
temperature scale: the current temperature is simply the reading on the display plus/
minus some error of reading or of malfunctioning of the scale. Similarly, they believe 
that we can reduce measurement error just by reading those reactions several times and 
calculating the average score. 
 However, objective measurement is also based on a theory, not on psychological 
theory but on a statistical theory such as “Classical Test Theory” or the Theory of Mental 
Tests (Gullik sen 1950), and its variants like “Item Response Theory,” IRT. Notably, their 
theory is not about psychological objects but about statistical constructs, for example, 
about “latent variables,” “latent classes,” or statistical “factors.” Through this theory, 
they create their own object of measurement, which may best be described as a “homo 
statis ticus.” Al though the textbooks on CTT and ITR are usually voluminous (e.g., Cohen 
& Swerdlik 2012, has 612 pages), this homo statisticus is described by a very simple 
statistical formula: Y = T + e. This formula means that the reading of the scale (“Y”) is 
simply the addition of the subjects’ “true” be havior (“T”) and some random error (“e”). 
The formulas of more sophisti cated sta tistical test theories are more complex but are 
essentially based on similar statistical assump tions (Wilson 2005).
 Can this homo statisticus be used to understand, predict and enhance human 
behavior? Can we use this statis tical construct, for example, for examining the empirical 
validity of psy cho logical theories of intelligence and morality, or for judging the efficacy 
of therapeutic and educatio nal programs, or for evalu ating students’ achievement? The 
answer is no. This be comes obvious when we translate the statistical for mu las underlying 
this construct into plain language. They allege that:
• Observation is simple. Objective psychologists believe that we can directly read 
the participants’ be ha vior without any psychological interpretation. As we have seen 
above, they believe that, for example, the participants’ behavior in an honesty experi ment 
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enables us to directly read his or her character. By definition this behavior is not affect-
ed by any other factor like the type of temp tation, the participants understanding of the 
test, or by their moral competence. To use another example, if a person gets 105 points 
on an IQ test, by definition it means nothing other than that this person real ly has an 
intelligence of 105 plus/minus some random error of the test.2 No other inter pretation is 
considered.
• Error is random. Any aberration of this statistical model from the real data is 
believed to be caused only by a random error of “reading the scale,” meaning that no 
syste ma tic factor of the participant or of the testing circumstances affects our reading of 
human behavior. 
• Repeated observation of identical behavior is possible. Because objective psycholo-
gists believe that any error is purely random, it averages to zero. Therefore, they assert, 
measurement error can be simply reduced to any smallness simply by repeat ing the 
reading as often as needed (the so called “law of large num bers”). But this requires us to 
believe that people respond to replications of the questions or task always in the same 
way, and that they are willing to do so. But not even objective psy cho logists seem to 
believe this. They hardly ever confront participants with iden tical ques tions or identi-
cal tasks. They reason that people would remember their ans wers, or refuse repetitions. 
So even behaviorists admit that there are internal factors (like remem ber ing, thinking, 
vigilance) interfering with observation and that, there fore, variation of behavior should 
not be regarded just as random error. 
• Similarity of behavior can be determined purely statistically. Because objective 
psy cho logists avoid psycho logi cal concepts, they use statistical means for defining the 
“similarity” of tasks and questions. They define two behaviors as similar if the parti-
cipants show them together. So, for example, if people answer two different questions in 
the same way, they are con sidered similar, or, if they solve task A and also task B in a math 
test, these two tasks are considered similar. If the items do not show statistical similarity, 
they are excluded from the test even though they may be consi der ed as highly valid by 
experts on the subject matter. Note that if all test items which threaten the reliability 
of the test are excluded from the test as “dissimilar,” the mea sure ment model becomes 
immune to refutation through data. This immuni zation violates a basic standard of 
good science, namely refutability (Popper 1967). It also calls the objectivity of objective 
psycho logy into question and creates an illusion ary reality. For example, Burton (1963) 
argued that the studies by Hartshorne and May (1928) would have actually proven the 
existence of a uniform character if the re sear chers had eliminated all expe ri ments from 
their analysis that were “unreliab le.” In other words, Burton reasons that there are two 
groups of people: those who are always honest and those who are always dishonest, and 
never in between, in all think able situ ations – except in all those situations in which they 
2  Variants of the CTT like Items-Response-Theory are more complex but rest basically on the same 




• Error and reliability are an attribute of the measurement instrument. If they were 
an attribute of the measure ment, they would not change from one application to another. 
But they do. Item selection does NOT lead to a stable estimate of a test’s reliability, but 
it varies from one test sample to another and from one test administration to another. 
For example, even though PISA tests are care fully trimmed on the basis of many prior 
studies and the replacement of “unreliable” tasks, the final tests still deviate substantially 
from the statistical model on which their con struc tion was based (Wuttke 2006; Jablon ka 
2007). If data change, it is not because of the tests. Tests are mostly, if not always, perfectly 
stable. Just observe a printed copy of the PISA-test for some months: you will find no 
change!
Objective psychologists like to compare their tests to the measurement by craftsmen 
and astro nomers. Carpenters usually read their meter stick twice. This is enough to make 
sure that they do not accidently saw the beams for a house construc tion too long or too 
short. The one-time repetition has the advantage that it hardly affects its object (although 
their yard stick may leave some marks behind) and that the inter val between the two 
readings is so short that the object does not change during the repe tition. Observing 
human behavior is much trickier. Do we really always read the same thing when we 
repeat our obser vations like a carpenter does? In certain contexts, it may suffice to repeat 
a test question only once to make sure that it is correctly recorded. But in contrast to 
the carpenter’s wood, people try to make sense out of test questions. So people may feel 
annoyed when being asked the same questions twice with out a cause. For example, if we 
ask a person twice how she feels, she will answer the second question only if we explain 
that we did not understand her first answer, or that we wanted to ob serve change. But in 
the latter case, a different answer does not indicate an error but a change of feeling. In 
these cases, the repetition of the test question does not produce random error, but rather 
a systematic change of behavior.
 Astronomers repeat their measurements more often. They do this because 
they want greater precision than a carpenter. Since many observa tions require a longer 
period, their targeted star (or the Earth) may move in the mean time, and their data reflect 
not only random measure ment error but also a change of location. This will bias their 
measure ment and the repetitions do not average to zero. Astronomers can differen tiate 
such systematic influen ces from random reading error by looking at the distri bu tion of 
their data. Only in as far as their data are dis tributed like a bell do they con sider them to 
be caused only by reading error. 
 In contrast, objective psychologists usually avoid testing the hypothesis of random 
error and thus they overlook any systematic bias and ambiguity of their measurements 
(Wuttke 2007; Jablonka 2007). They may overlook, for example, as Scott (1968) showed, 
that scores in the middle range of an attitudes scale can have three very different meanings: 
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They can mean, as researchers mostly assume, (1) that the respondents have a medium 
attitude toward the declared object of the scale (like “conservatism”). But these scores 
can also mean (2) that they do not have such an atti tude at all, but instead rate the items 
in regard to other criteria. Or these scores could mean (3) that the respondents have a 
differentiated attitude which involves more than the one attitude. 
 In order to clarify this ambiguity, I re-analyzed the findings from a longi tu dinal 
study on uni ver sity students’ political attitudes (Lind 1985a). The authors of this study 
reported that at in the first semester, students’ attitudes become more liberal, and after 
graduation they become more con ser vative again. They interpreted these changes of stu-
dents’ attitudes as a conse quence of their adap tation to different environments, which 
presumably changed from con ser vative to liberal (university) and than back again to 
conservative (workplace). 
 How ever, my secondary analy sis of their statistics for “measurement error” over 
the span of university study, actually revealed a structural transfor ma tion of stu dents’ 
political attitudes: first the error was large, then de creased and then in creased again. This 
supports the hypothesis that students had hardly any “con ser va tive” attitude when they 
entered university. Then they developed a consistent (liberal) atti tude, and finally their 
attitu de became more differentiated, so that “measurement error” increases again and 
the scores moved back again to the middle of the conservatism scale. In other words, the 
students did not just adapt to their environment but also deve loped a higher competence 
for politi cal reason ing. It was the re searcher’s statistical model which made students’ 
structural develop ment look like a pure “to and fro” of attitudes. 
 The blindness of objective psychology to structural aspects of human behavior 
explains Hartshorne and May’s (1928) failure to produce evidence for the existence of 
charac ter. Only after the completion of their study did Hartshorne and his colleagues 
admit that exclu ding internal traits from their observations was a mistake: “The essence 
of the act is its pre tense. Hence [character] can be described and understood only in terms 
of the human ele ments in the situation. It is not the act that constitutes the deception, nor 
the parti cular inten tion of the actor, but the relation of this act to his intentions and to the 
intentions of his asso ci ates” (Hart shorne & May 1928, 377) The authors also admitted 
the blindness of their measure ment model to the com petence aspect of character: “A trait 
such as honesty or dishonesty is an achieve ment like ability in arithmetic, depending 
of course on native capacities of various kinds” (Hart shorne & May 1928, 379). Already 
some years earlier, the psychiatrist Levy-Suhl (1912) was surprised to find in his study 
of juvenile delinquents that they upheld the same moral values as non-delin quent youth. 
There fore he hypothesized that they actu al ly must differ in respect to their moral matu-
rity, which psychologists were not able to measure at that time. 
 Another example for the discrepancy between the statistical measurement model 
and psychological reality is the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA). The physicist Joachim Wuttke (2007) found much “evidence for multi dimen siona-
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lity,” that is, for the existence for several internal factors. This contradicts the measure-
ment model on which the PISA tests are based. The evidence, he notes, 
is even more striking on the back ground that the cognitive items actually used 
in PISA have been preselected for uni dimen si o nality: Sub mis sions from parti-
cipating coun tries were streamlined by ‘professional item writers,’ re view ed by 
national ‘subject matter experts,’, tested with students in think aloud interviews, 
tested in a pre-pilot study in a few countries, tested in a field trial in most parti-
cipant countries, rated by expert groups, and selected by the consortium (…). 
Only one-third of the items that had reached the field trial were finally used in the 
main test. Items that did not fit into the idea that compe tence can be measured 
in a culturally neutral way on a one-dimensi o nal scale were simply eliminated. 
Field test results remain unpublished, although one could imagine an open-ended 
analysis providing valuable insight into the diversity of education outcomes. This 
adds to Olsen’s (…) observation that in PISA-like studies the major portion of 
information is thrown away (Wuttke 2007, 249–250).
 If objective psychologists used this thrown-away information they could interpret 
respondents’ test scores more adequately. They would discover, for example, that the 
same task which is designed to chal lenge the respon dents’ math competence might actual-
ly chal lenge quite different dis posi tions, name ly their ability to guess the “right” answer, 
their abili ty to copy it from other test takers, their know ledge of how to handle tests (test 
skill), their ability to stay awake on long testing cycles, and their ability to master their 
test anxiety, just to name a few of the factors which can influence a testee score. Or they 
might discover that “wrong” an swers do not indicate a lack of math competence but that 
the testee made only a small error, or was not able to read the often wordy instructions 
quickly enough or was blocked by test anxiety. (Wuttke 2007) Similarly, behaviorist 
psychologists, who operatio nally define participants’ moral character as an “honest” re-
action to a situation of temp tation, give them a high score regardless of whether or not 
these actually have high moral stan dards, or only inciden tally acted “honestly” in this 
situation, or succeeded without the need to cheat because they knew all the answers (in 
fact cheating correlated negatively with IQ), or wanted to help a friend by letting her copy 
their test answers. So these scores have highly ambiguous psychological meaning.
 Calling all these possible causes of test scores “random error” pre vents any 
improvement of these tests and any progress of psychology as a science (Rosen thal & 
Rosnow 1997; Loev in ger 1957). Moreover, it also undermines the trust in the validity 
of these tests. How can we expect con sumers to trust tests, when even the chosen “test 
format or method of assess ment can cause large differences in student scores?” (Walberg 
et al. 1994, 232) How can we rely on expensive studies like PISA for edu cational policy-
making if it “is do mi nated and driven by psycho metric [i.e., statistical] concerns, and 
much less by educational,” writes the nuclear physicist Sjoberg (2007, 212). 
 How can we call these tests “psycho metric” if there is no “psycho” in its metric? 
While the physical units of measure ment are physically defined and standar dized, the 
units of “standardized psychometric tests” are not defined psychologically and are not 
stan dardized objectively but only statistically. Their metric changes with the data of each 
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study, like rubber bands which stretch and bend as needed but are not reliable in the true 
sense of this word.
 In spite of their blindness in regard to psychological theories, objective 
“psychologists” claim that their statistical models can be used to evaluate psychological 
theories, thera peutic methods, educa tio nal poli cies and competencies of people. They 
underpin this claim with a naming trick: (a) They give their statistical constructs 
psychological names like intelli gence, charac ter, or conservatism, and (b) They equate 
pattern of correlations across groups of people with an in di vi dual mind’s “structure.” 
But like family names, these names do not actually esta blish a real relationship between 
statistics and psychology. Or would Mrs. Miller allow an unrelat ed Mr. Miller to share her 
bedroom, just because he bears the same family name?
 Anyway, this trick seems to work. World-wide, millions of dollars are spent 
every year on “ob jec tive” tests of academic abilities, vocational skills, character, mental 
dis orders, and so on, in the hope that they can help to improve therapy, education and 
the politics of mental health and education. These tests have severe con sequences for 
millions of students, job appli cants, career seekers, mentally ill people, teachers, educa-
tion al policy makers and many more who are tested many times throughout their lives, 
and also for decision-makers who base their policies on reported test scores. Because 
these tests measure something dif fe rent from what they pretend to measure, they can 
cause a lot of damage. If these tests are bad, they will mislead us when we use them to 
evalu ate methods and policies of therapy and edu ca tion. If, for example, bad teaching 
practice pro duces higher scores on these tests than good teaching prac tice, they will 
defeat our educational system (Sjoberg 2017). 
 The dilemma of objective psychologists, it seems, is rooted in the ambiguous 
mean ing of the word “objective.” This word can take on quite different meanings:
• Transparency: This is an essential requirement of real science and good 
psychological practice. Only if data collection and scoring are fully transparent and 
uniform can they be critically examined by third parties. The questions and tasks of 
objective tests are usually transparent but often not available for the independent ex-
perts. The scoring of the answers is obscure for the customers. Instead of reporting the 
numbers of solved tasks, the scores are multiplied to make differences look large, and 
are transformed to make them look like a bell-shape. Ironically, the bell-shape indicates 
that the scores are pure error scores. Natural traits are hardly ever distributed like that: 
“An investigation of the distributional characteristics of 440 large-sample achievement 
and psycho metric measures found all to he significantly non-normal at the alpha .01 
significance level” (Micceri 1989, 156; see also Walberg et al. 1984). Finally, test scores 
are often obscure because important informa tion like item selection and par tici pants’ 
attrition rates is held back.
• Freedom from theory: To be objective we need an object. Theories are an essential 
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basis of any measurement. If we want to measure a psychological object like an orientation 
or a competence, we need a psychological theory to define its nature. If we ban any 
psycho logical theory from our measure ment method, we deprive it lite ral ly of its object. 
The test’s relia bility and precision become meaningless and its results useless. 
• Statistical standards. The term “standardized” in the word “standardized tests” is 
actu al ly a misnomer, because it does not mean that an individuals’ test scores de pend on 
a fixed standard but it means that an individual’s scores depends on other people’s test 
scores, namely how they com pare to the scores of some sample of people. Such relative 
“standards” suggest wrong interpretations. For example, if a student solves ten more 
tasks on a test than he did last time, and if at the same time the members of the standardi-
zation sample also solve ten more tasks, his score (e.g., “percentile”) will not increase and 
thus make him look as if he did not learn any thing. 
• External or internal standards. Objectivity is often used to mean external standards 
for scoring the participants’ responses. However, objectivity can also require that we score 
a test in re gard to the indivi duals’ own standards, for example, if we want to measure how 
much progress they have made in regard to their own learning aims, or if we want to 
measure moral competence, which is defined as behaving in accordance with one’s own 
moral principles.
 How to Make Psychological Traits Visible 
As I have shown, both mainstream approaches to measuring psychological attitudes 
and com petencies are questionable. It has been often suggested to ease these problems 
by combining them in educational research and evaluation. But combining two bad meals 
does not make a good dinner. We should rather seek to find a better way of measurement 
which can replace the currently used ones. 
 As we have seen above, objective psychologists assume that internal psychological 
traits are not directly observable, and that structure is irrelevant, that is, that individual 
responses to test questions are unambiguously revealing the human trait under 
investigation and no other ones. In contrast, subjective psychologists target internal 
psychological traits can be made visible only by subjective methods on subjective ratings 
instead of on direct observations. But, as Jean Piaget (1965) admits, this is not a solution: 
“The point, then, that we have to settle is whether the things that children say to us 
constitute, as compared to the real conduct, a con scious reali zation (...), reflection (...) or 
psittacism (...). We do not claim to have solved the problem com plete ly. Only direct obser-
vation can settle it” (Piaget 1965, 115).  
 Already a hundred and fifty years ago the Dutch psycho logist Franciscus Donders 
(1969/1868) showed how we can directly observe psychological traits.  He was pro bably 
the first who discovered that we can test measurement hypotheses in the same way as we 
test hypotheses about the impact of exter nal factors on human behavior. He hypo the sized 
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that humans are not merely machines who always react to stimuli like an automaton, 
but that they also think when it is needed. To test this hypo thesis he designed a simple 
experiment for which he con structed an ingenious time re corder for measuring very 
short reaction times. When he gave his parti cipants clearly distinct stimuli, they reacted 
as quickly as an automaton. But when he gave them similar stimuli, they presented them 
with a “dilem ma”, so that their reactions took much longer. Ob vious ly under the second 
condition they had to think before reacting.
 The problem of the ambiguity of human behavior has been solved in principle by 
the Hungarian-American psychologist Egon Brunswik (1955). He has shown how we can 
disentangle multiple factors of behavior with what he called the “diacritical method.” His 
idea was that we must design our observation as a multivariate experiment, in which the 
traits that are believed to determine particular responses are used as “design factors.” 
Only such a structural experimental design of our observation can make the determining 
traits.
 On the basis of Donders and Brunswik’s ideas, I have developed the concept of 
Experi men tal Questionnaire, EQ (Lind 1982; 2019). EQs make human traits directly visible 
without involving dubious assumptions. They do not require statistical expertise in order 
to see the trait under investigation. The translation of the visible results into numerical 
scores is only done in order to facilitate the statistical analysis of mass data. 
 EQs con front the participants with a carefully designed pattern of stimuli, tasks, 
questions, or situ ations. The pattern is design ed as an individual multivariate experiment. 
The design-factors of this multivariate experi ment are chosen to directly correspond with 
the dispositional factors that are hypothe ti cally in volved in the parti ci pant’s response to 
those tasks, questions or situations. That is, the construction of the design-factors of an 
EQ requires a psychological theory about the measurement object. When the design-
factors of EQs are chosen to be indepen dent of each other, we can literally see the impact 
of each hypothesized factor on a participant’s re sponses in the pattern of an individual’s 
responses, in a similar way as we can read brain activities from the monitor of a brain 
scanner. 
 On the base of this new methodology, I constructed the first objective Moral Com­
pe­tence­Test, MCT (formerly called Moral­Judgment­Test) (Lind 1978, 2019). After review-
ing a vast amount of research (Lind 1985b; 2002: Lind & Nowak 2015) and considering 
modern ethical theories (especially, Habermas 1990), I have defined moral com petence as 
the­ability­to­solve­pro­blems­and­conflicts­on­the­basis­of­moral­principles­through­thinking­
and discussion instead of though violence, deceit, or complying with others (Lind 2019). Like 
Kohlberg (1963) I consider as criterion for moral competence inner moral orientations 
instead of external standards. Moral competence, as the MCT defines it, is the ability to 
behave in accordance with one’s own moral principles instead of with conformity to other 
people’s judgments. 
 More specifically, moral competence becomes visible when a person judges the 
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arguments concerning a controversial decision in regard to the arguments’ perceived 
moral quality instead of their opinion agreement. As Keasey (1974) observed in a series 
of experiments, this ability seems to be low in most people. So we decided to use this task 
for measuring moral competence. If people have not developed such a moral sense, they 
cannot solve problems und conflicts through moral thinking and moral discussion but 
must use violence, deceit or submission to others.
 In order to make visible people’s ability to rate argu ments in regard to their moral 
quality instead of to their opinion­agree ment or to the particular context, we used three 
hypothesized traits as design-factors for the MCT:
(1) Dilemma context: The participants are confronted with two stories in which a 
prota gonist has to make a difficult decision. They are asked to take sides: Was the prota-
gonist’s decision right or wrong? 
(2) Opinion­agreement: After each story the participants are to rate several argu-
ments supporting and opposing their own opinion. They should say how much they re ject 
or accept them on a scale from -4 to +4). 
(3) Moral quality: All the arguments have all been pain staking ly written so as to 
represent a clearly distinct moral quality, namely one of the six types of moral reasoning 
described by Kohlberg (1984). In order to secure their theoretical validi ty, the arguments 
were reviewed by several experts of Kohlber g’s stage-typology and then re vised 
accordingly (Lind 1978; Lind & Wakenhut 2010). 
Thus each item of the MCT represents a specific manifestation of the three 
dispositional factors which may determine people’s judgment. The items of the MCT have 
a 6 x 2 x 2 multivariate experimental design. Due to this experimental design, we can 
literally see the re spondent’s degree of moral compe tence directly by looking at their 
pattern of responses. Only the whole pattern of a respondent’s behavior contains the 
struc tural information which defines moral competence. If we looked only at isolated 
responses, we would not be able to see their structure. Isolated items are bare of any 
structure.
 In order to facilitate further statistical analysis, one can translate this visible 
pattern into the numerical C-score (C for compe tence). The C-score is the pro por tion of 
individual judg ment variation caused by the moral quality of the argu ments as compared 
to the respondent’s total judgment variation. The C-score ranges from 0 to 100, the higher 
scores indicating higher moral competence. Mean C-scores are rarely higher than 30, 
indicating that for most people it is indeed rather difficult to engage in a moral discourse. 
Most people judge argu ments mostly, or even solely, on the basis of their agreement with 
their opinion. 
 The measurement theory on which the MCT is based can be rigorously tested 
without saving circularity. As already mentioned, the content validity of its items 
(arguments) has been examined through ratings by several experts of Kohlberg’s typology 
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of moral orienta tions. The structural validity of the MCT can be experimentally tested in 
regard to four prominent hypotheses of cognitive-developmental theory: 
• Competence nature of morality: In contrast to many other psychologists, Piaget 
(1965) and Kohlberg (1958, 1964) hypo the sized that moral behavior is not only affec tive 
in nature but also cognitive, that is, it is not only determined by people’s moral orient a-
tions (values, attitudes, principle, and so on) but also by their moral compe tence. This 
competence hypothesis has been clearly supported by experiments. While participants can 
be instructed to fake their moral orienta tions upward (Emler et al. 1983), the same kind 
of instruction fails to make participants fake their MCT’s C-scores upward (Lind 2002). 
Experi ments also showed that the ability to esti mate other people’s moral competence is 
positively correlated with their own moral competence (Wasel cited in Lind 2002). 
• Moral competence is a unique skill. The ability to solve moral dilemmas is not just 
a linguistic skill but is a unique competence. This has been shown by the research team 
of Kristin Prehn (2013) of the Charité Hospital in Berlin. Moral competence as measured 
with the MCT correlates highly with neural activities in the right dorso-lateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPC) when subjects’ brain activities are studied in a brain scanner while they are 
confronted with moral problems: the lower their C-score is the longer their right DLPC is 
busy. This phenomenon does not show when the subjects are confronted with linguistic 
problems.
• Hierarchical preference order: Kohlberg (1958, 1984) and Rest (1969) 
hypothesized that the six types of moral orientations – which were identified on the basis 
of philo sophical analysis – form a universal order of moral adequacy. This hypothesis 
lets us predict that people will prefer these types according to their order. This, as Karl 
Pop per (1968) would say, is a very informative, because daring, hypothesis. Since the six 
types of orien tation can be ordered in 720 (= 6!) different ways, the risk of a coin cidental 
confir ma tion of the hypothesis is very small (p = 1/720 = 0.0014). Note that this risk is 
much smaller than the risk of accidently confirm ing a conventional sta tist i cal hypothesis 
(p < 0.05). The risk of accidental confirmation becomes ex treme ly small if, for example, 
we test this hypo thesis with ten people (p = 0.001410). It is even more astonishing that 
his hypothesis has been almost unanimously confirmed in many empirical studies (Lind 
1986; 2002). 
• Simplex structure of moral orientations: Kohlberg (1958) hypothesized that the 
cor re lations between the six types of moral orientation show a “simplex structure,” which 
means that neighboring orientations correlate more highly with each other than with 
more distant orientations. The many MCT studies support this hypothesis with very few 
excep tions (Lind 1978, 2002). 
• Affective-cognitive parallelism: Piaget (1976) hypothesized that affective and 
cogni tive aspects of beha vior are “parallel.” This hypothesis has two important impli cat-
ions. First, Piaget saw orientations and competences not as separable components, but as 
two distinguishable aspects of behavior. This means that he rejected the prevailing notion 
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that human traits are components which can be separated from each other and from 
behavior, and can be measured separately. So all attempts to assess them separate ly are 
in vain. Second, his parallelism hypothesis lets us predict that the higher people’s moral 
compe tence is, the more clearly they will prefer higher types of moral orientations, and 
reject low, inadequate types. Only with the MCT does it become possible to test Piaget’s 
hypothesis, because only this test allows us to measure affect and cognition as distinct 
but inseparable aspects. So far, all MCT studies have very clearly supported Piaget’s 
parallelism hypothesis (Lind 2002, 2013). 
The­exceptionally­clear­confirmation­of­these­four­core­hypotheses­shows­that­moral­com-
petence is something real and than it can be made visible in an objective and valid way. 
This gives us the opportunity to test hypotheses about the relevance, development and 
teachability of moral competence in an objective and unbiased way. 
•  Relevance: Already studies using Kohlberg’s Moral Judg ment Interview have found 
that moral competence determines our social behavior more than any other psycho logical 
trait. Experimental and correlation studies using the MCT con firm and extend these 
findings. Moral competence seems to be highly instru mental for such important behaviors 
like helping people in distress, engaging in democracy, obeying the law, respecting a 
contract, blowing the whistle, fulfilling academic achievement require ments, and making 
quick decisions (Lind 2019). A C-score above 20 seems to be critical. Only when people 
have a moral competence higher than 20 does their behavior in experiments show some 
determination by inner moral orientations. People who lack any moral competence either 
conform to the perceived opinion of the majority of people or to the orders of an authority, 
like in the Milgram experiment (Kohlberg 1984). 
•  Development: MCT research has refuted the cognitive-developmen tal postulate 
of invariant sequence of development: People’s moral competence can regress if they 
do not have an opportunity to use it for a longer period of time (Lind 2000; Schillinger 
2006; Lupu 2009; Saeidi 2011). Yet it supports the find ings of Kohlberg and his asso ciates 
that moral competence can be effectively fostered through certain methods of dilemma 
discussions (Lind 2002). 
•  Education: Finally, the MCT lets us objectively and economically measure the 
effi cacy and efficiency of methods and pro grams of moral education, like the Konstanz 
Method of Dilemma Discussion (KMDD) (Lind 2002, 2019; Hemmerling 2014). 
  Conclusion
Experimentally designed tests let us make psychological traits visible, validly and 
objective ly. Experimentally designed tests accomplish what subjective psycho lo gists 
always wanted to achieve, and what objective psychologists could not deliver: They make 
it possible to measure the properties of humans’ internal traits through direct obser va-
tion of their be havior. Moreover, experi mental ly designed tests allow us to examine the 
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truth of the assump tions on which they are based. Experimentally designed tests can be 
used not only in moral psychology but in any field of psycho logy in which testable theories 
and clear definitions of their objects are available.
 A final caveat: experimental questionnaires should be used only for research and 
evaluation of methods and programs, not for evaluating people. That is, the MCT must not 
be used for high-stakes testing of students, teachers, or named institutions. There is no 
evi dence that test-based sanctions lead to better learning and better behavior. Moreover, 
sanc tions undermine the validity of psychological tests and, therewith, impede their use-
ful ness for improving therapy and education (Amrein & Berliner 2002; Ravitch 2013; 
Koretz 2017). When used for high-stakes testing, tests wear out within a few years and 
must be substituted by new content. Thus their findings can be compared only through 
daring statistical constructions (Linn 2010). In contrast, the MCT celebrates its 44th 
anniversary and still has not had to be changed (beside a few minor editorial corrections). 
Thus it has provided us with a great wealth of data that stretch over a long period of time 
and across many cultures. This in turn allows us to test many hypotheses on the nature, 
relevance, and teachability of moral com petence. 
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